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THE MODERN "DROIT D'AUBAINE."*
One of the dark spots in the dark and middle ages is the
treatment of foreigners. Was a ship wrecked upon the French
coast? What was saved was saved for the seigneur who owned
the shore, or his overlord, the king. The lading and the crew
were alike his, to dispose of as he would. If the sailors were
uncivil enough to set up a claim to the wreckage, he could kill
them. If he preferred, he could sell them as slaves. It was
his right-the droit de naufrage.
On the same principle, down to modern times, if a man hap-
pened to die while traveling or living abroad, his estate, in
many countries of Europe, was seized and kept by the lord of
the manor, or the sovereign of the land. His will was disre-
garded. His natural heirs, unless born on the soil or natural-
ized citizens, were set aside. All that he left belonged to the
governing power.
Quite naturally, as trade between nations became more con-
siderable, the countries which retained this droit d'aubaine in
its full vigor and severity, found few merchants ready to bring
cargoes to their ports. The result was successive modifications
of the system. Certain trading centers were exempted from
its operation. Naturalization was to be easily had by traders,
and when obtained relieved them from subjection to it. Govern-
* This article is substantially the same as an address delivered by the
author, as vice-president of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, and chairman of the Section on Social and Economic Science, at
Philadelphia, December 29, i9o4.
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ment securities held by any foreigners passed to their natural
successors or by will. 1
The interest of the government called for such relaxations of
its so-called right, and the king who relaxed it most, because
he saw most clearly that it was for his advantage so to do,
found the foreign trade of his dominions grow most rapidly, and
settle itself upon the most stable footing.
The droit de naufrage was the first to disappear. The
humaner law of the Christian emperors of Rome. 2 followed by
the Visigoths in Spain in the seventh century, 8 and enforced in
the twelfth by the laws of Oleron, 4 appealed successfully to the
awakening conscience of the modern world.
Anything in the nature of a droit d'aubaine had also been
denounced in the Corpus juris of Roman law. 5 As time went
on its range became more and more contracted, and by the
close of the middle ages it had become, so far as personal
property was concerned, generally softened in practice to what
was called ajus detractis, 6 except in case of those dying intestate
and without known heirs.
As respects real estate in one country owned by citizens of
another, the sovereign of the former might still claim it as his
own; but it was because political considerations were deemed
to require it. In a nation whose constitution of'government or
family institutions rest on a landed electorate or aristocracy, it
is right to debar foreigners from holding what might enable
them to influence directly the conduct of government. This is
the defense of the system of escheats under the common law of
England, abolished there in I87o,7 but which still lingers on in
many of the United States.
It took the flames of revolution to burn the droit d'aubaine
out of the institutions of France, and for a time, under
Napoleon, it was restored as respects citizens of any nation
which yet might retain it. 8
z. Merlin, Ripertoire de jurispOrudence, Atubaine, No. VII.
2. Code XI, III, 5, de naufragiis i. Cf. Digest, XLIX, XV, de cafit:-
vis et de Aiostlimtni, 5, 2.
3. V. 5, Corius juris Germanici2001.
4. Art. 25, 26. i Peters' Admiralty Decisions, xli, note.
S. Code VI, LIX, Communia de Successionibus io.
6. Fiore, Droit International PrivdI, Preliminaries, Ch. II.
7. With a proviso that an alien acquiring land should gain no political
rights thereby.
8. Civil Code, Arts. 726, 9X2; Law of July L4, 1819.
THE MODERN "-ROIT D 'A UBAIrNE."
Under the Jus detractus, the sovereign, within whose domin.
ions a foreigner chanced to die, no longer claimed title to all
his goods, unless no will and no next of kin were anywhere to
be found. 9 He was content with part, and, after making this
"detraction," or, as we would say, "subtraction," gave up the
rest to the natural heirs, or those to whom it might have been
bequeathed by will.
So if a subject of his own should die, leaving a will in favor
of foreigners, or having only foreign heirs, they were admitted
to the succession, subject to a detraction of the same kind.
The percentages retained, in either case as time went on,
became more and more moderate. Reciprocal conventions be-
tween different nations for their regulation in this respect were
not uncommon. - Five per cent, which was the duty imposed in
the first inheritance tax law of Rome-the vicesima hereditatum
et legatorum decreed by Augustus' 0 -became not an unusual
rate to fix by such an agreement in the latter half of the
eighteenth century. 1 1
So far as concerns such a tax on foreigners who come to take
away what forms part of the wealth of a nation, it is, if the rate
be moderate, in no sense inequitable. But for one sovereign to
tax what belongs to the wealth of another bears a different
aspect. It is the droit d'aubaine in a new dress and a politer
form. It even asserts itself over a larger field.
The ancient droit d'aubaine was exerted almost exclusively
in the case of foreigners dying within the realm; never except
over tangible property found within it, belonging to their
estates. The modern droit d'aubaine fastens upon all their prop-
erty so found, whether tangible or intangible, and this whether
they died within the realm or in their own country, out of
which, perhaps, they had never set their feet.
In the first treaty of the United States with a foreign power,
its right of detraction, with respect to estate left within its
9. If there be no better claim, that of the sovereign within whose terri-
tory property left by the dead is found is clearly good. The leading powers
of confinental Europe, at their Conference held at the Hague in 19o4, agreed
(subject to the principle of reciprocity) to the mutual recognition of this right
and the denial of any other in the nature of escheat or aubaine. Projet d'un
Convention sur les Conflits de lois en matihre de succession et de testaments,
Art. II. Revue de .Droit International Privd, VI, 348. Sixteen European
powers and also Japan agreed to and signed this project June 7, 19o4.
io. Caracalla doubled the duty, and his successor abolished it. fleineccius,
Antiy. Rom. Syntagma, I, App. §g.
iz. See Merlin. Riertoire de_1urisfirudence, Ditracion.
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jurisdiction by an American citizen, was excluded, provided a
reciprocal exemption were assured in return. This was that
made with France in 1778 (and abrogated by Congress twenty
years later), Article XI of which reads thus:
"The subjects and inhabitants of t'he said United States, or
any one of them, shall not be reputed aubains in France, and
consequently shall be exempted from the droit d'aubaine, or
other similar duty, under what name soever. They may by
testament, donation, or otherwise, dispose of their goods,
movable and immovable, in favor of such persons as to them
shall seem good, and their heirs, subjects of the said United
States, residing whether in France or elsewhere, may succeed
them ab intestat, without being obliged to obtain letters of
naturalization, and without having the effect of this concession
contested or impeded under pretext of any rights or prerogative
of provinces, cities, or private persons; and the said heirs,
whether such by particular title, or ab intestat, shall be exempt
from all duty called droit de detraction, or other duty of the
same king, saving nevertheless the local rights or duties, as
much and as long as similar ones are not established by the
United States, or any of them. The subjects of the Most
Christian King shall enjoy on their part, in all the dominions
of the said States, an entire and perfect reciprocity relative to
the stipulations contained in the present article, but it is at the
same time agreed that its contents shall not affect the laws
made, or that may be made hereafter in France against emi-
grations which shall remain in all their force and vigour, and
the United States on their part, or any of them, shall be at
liberty to enact such laws relative to that matter as to them
shall seem proper."
1 2
Among our subsequent treaties with like or broader provis-
ions may be mentioned those with Sweden of 1783, with Wur-
temburg of 1844, with Saxony of 1845,1 with France of 1853,14
with Switzerland of 1850, with Honduras of 1864, with Germany
of 1876, with Italy of 1878, and with Great Britain of i9oo.'5
The exemptions secured by those of the older type related only
to property left in or subject to the control of one country by
citizens of the other, at the time of their decease. They did
not extend to interests of citizens of one in successions to
estates of citizens of the other, which are in course of adminis-
tration in the courts of the latter.' 6  The later conventions do
extend to these.17
12. 2 U. S. Rev. Stat. 2o6.
13. 2 U. S. Rev. Stat. 723, 8og, 69o.
14. Comp. of Treaties in Force (i899) 186.
15. 31 U. S. Statutes at Large 1939.
6. Frederickson v. Louisiana, 23 Howard's Reports 445.
x7. Geofroy v'. Riggs 133 U. S. Reports 258.
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The provision in the Constitution of the United States, secur-
ing to the citizens of one State the ordinary privileges common
to citizens of any other into which they may go, gives to our
people a somewhat similar measure of security. But it has not
prevented the building up, slowly at first, rapidly of late, of a
net-work of State tax laws, imposing succession duties on
property left within the State by deceased citizens of other
States, without regard to whether their representatives have
already paid similar duties at home, and so are subjected to a
.double burden for a single privilege.
Within limits, no economist will question the propriety of
laying taxes on bequests and inheritances. They are collected
with ease and reasonable certainty. They fall upon something
which the taxpayer has never yet enjoyed and the diminution
of which he therefore does not fully miss. The goose, to follow
Colbert's maxim, is plucked so as to get the most feathers with
the least squealing, and almost with none. Live goose
feathers, indeed, are not required. The real victim is dead.
As to whether the form to be preferred is that of a probate
duty, a stamp duty, a tax on the privilege of transmission, or a
tax on the privilege of receiving what is transmitted, opinions
may fairly differ;
Death duties were first imposed in Great Britain towards the
close of the seventeenth century. Under the system, developed
there the movable property, wherever situated, of a person
dying domiciled in the kingdom, is subject to them; but not
such property left in the kingdom by one who died domiciled
in any other country. 18
What is taxed is not the interest in property to which some
person succeeds because of the death of its former owner, and
not property at all, but the interest in property which the
former owner lost upon his death, and which would have ceased
to exist altogether, had not the State seen fit to prolong it in
favor of those whom it recognizes as entitled to the succession.
It is this prolongation or revival of an estate which death
has destroyed-a prolongation by force of no natural law, but
only of the will of the political sovereign, that justifies a suc-
cession tax.' 9
The earliest American succession duties were levied by Con-
iS. Wharton's Private International Law, %8o, a, 643. As to probate
duties, the statutes make a different provision. Fernandes' Executors' Case,
5 Chancery Appeals 314.
ig. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. Reports 41, 4g. 55.
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gress in 1797, and took the form of a stamp tax on receipts for
legacies.
Pennsylvania was the first State to impose them. She did
this in 1826, but the law did not extend to goods of those not
inhabitants of the State, which had been temporarily left
there. 2 0 They were left untouched, in deference to the ancient
maxim of private international law, mobiliapersonam sequuntur.
It was this maxim that had always been the 6hief measure
of the jurisdiction of courts over the settlement of the estates
of the dead. The estate had been treated as a kind of a sur-
vival of the person who once held and administered it. It
therefore had its principal seat in the place which had been his
home. Transfers of goods inter vivos, founded on contract, may
be regulated by the law of the place of transfer, but transfers
of the whole of a man's goods, upon his death, by force or per-
mission of law, must, in fairness to all concerned, be regulated
by the law to which he was subject. In England and America,
it is settled that this is the law of his domicil.
Those to whom that law gives them acqilire a good title, the
world over. There is but one succession to a dead man's goods,
and that takes place once for all when he dies and where he
dwelt. 21 This law, which protected him while they were his,
and directs the course of their devolution, when he is no more,
may justly tgx those who benefit by their devolution, irrespec-
tive of the place of their residence, or of that where the goods
may chance to be found.
Our American succession taxes, like those of England, are
everywhere, when imposed by the State where the decedent had
his home, measured by a percentage of the value of all his
goods, wherever situated, and all his real estate situated within
the State; subject to some exemption of moderate amount.
But during the last twenty or thirty years the States have
begun to go farther and charge a like percentage on all goods
of a non-resident, which may be subject to their power.
There is no legal objection to this.
It is not double taxation within the meaning of any consti-
tutional prohibition. In law, double taxation occurs only
when the same sovereign taxes the same thing twice. But
aside from this, a law of the kind now in question does not tax
20. Orcutt's Afif4eal, 97 Penn. State Reports 179.
21. Cross v. United States Trust Co., i3z N. Y. Reports 330; 30 North-
eastern Reporter 125; Frothinglzam v'. Shawv, I75 Mass. Reports 59; 55 North.
eastern Reporter 623.
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the same thing, which had been taxed before. The sovereign
of the domicil only can tax the succession to goods, because the
succession takes place, once for all, under his laws and in his
territory. What the sovereign of the situs of goods left by a
foreign decedent taxes is not the succession to them, and not
the goods themselves, but the privilege of taking them away
under the title derived from that succession. 2 2 The title is
unquestionable, and unquestioned, but the fight of the owner
to avail himself of it in foreign territory depends on the comity
of the foreign sovereign who, if he permits a transfer, can pre-
scribe the terms.
23
Nor is a tax so imposed any infringement of the privileges
and immunities of citizens of other States, for they are treated
precisely as those of the State by authority of which the tax
is laid.
It is an infringement of a maxim of private international
law; but such maxims may be set aside by any political sover-
eign who thinks it for his interest to disregard them. Our
courts, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, treat the
doctrines of private international law as part of the common or
unwritten law; but it is only in the absence of legislation to
the contrary. A statute can always abrogate unwritten law.
Not only is it lawful but in many cases it seems not unjust
for a sovereign to tax the succession on goods within his domin-
ions, left by a foreigner. If they were not simply in transit,
but had been there so long as to become part of the wealth of
-the realm and to share in the settled protection of the govern-
ment, they were subject to taxation for it when the owner was
alive; and as the new successors must come there for possession,
and can only dispossess those in whose hands they may be left
by force of this sovereign's laws, and if need be, by process
from his courts, they cannot seriously complain if he asserts a
right to tax them for what they get.
So is it also in the case of intangible property when that has
been long placed by the owner in the hands of agents in a
foreign country, to manage and invest.2 4
22. Foelix, Droit International Privd, 1, 59.
23. Magoun v. Illinois Trust &- Savings Bank, I70 U. S. Reports 283,
288; Dammert v. Osborn, 14z N. Y. Reports 564; 35 Northeastern Reporter
407.
24. New Orleans 'v. Stemhel, 175 U. S. Reports 309; In re Lewis' Estate
203 Penn. State Reports 211; 52 Atlantic Reporter 275; In re Romaine, 127
N. Y. Reports 88; 27 Northeastern Reporter 759; 12 Lawyers' Reports Anno-
tated 401,
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But while such successions can be taxed by the sovereign of
the domicil and taxed again by the sovereign of the situs, it is
quite another question whether they should be.
Had we adhered inflexibly to the universal maxim of ancient
law-mobilia personam sequuntur-the results would unques-
tionably have been far better. Every State laying a succes-
sion tax lays as high a one as it deems best to impose. It
selects a certain subject for taxation and presumably exacts all
that it can fairly be made to yield. For another State to tax
the same subject again, therefore, is to impose a heavier
burden than it ought to bear.
If the State in which the decedent's estate is settled collected
the only duty, and this were the universal principle, nothing in
the long run could be lost by any other State. On the average,
one would profit as much as another by uniformity of rule.
While every State would let the citizens of another withdraw the
property of the dead untaxed from its territory, its own citi-
zens, as heirs or legatees, would bring back with equal freedom
property of the same kind from all the rest.
As a matter of fact and history our legislatures in this
matter have claimed the benefit of the rule mobilia personam
sequuntur whenever it served their purpose to invoke it, and set
it aside whenever it served their purpose to disregard it.
The test of taxability, as respects a succession to intangible
property of a non-resident, may be said to be this: Whatever
may be its form, if it have a money value and, although it may
be fully owned by and fully transferable by the successor,
cannot be enforced or converted into money contrary to the
will of the person against whom the right of property exists,
without coming into the State imposing the tax, then it is
property within that State and taxable as such. 
2 5
If a citizen of Texas die, having money on deposit in a New
York bank, a succession tax may be levied on it by New York,
as well as by Texas.2 6 If he leave bonds in his box in the
vaults of a New York safe deposit company, and they are due
from a citizen or corporation of New York, both States can
exact the same percentage on these. If the bonds are those of a
25. n re Whiting's Estate, i5o N. Y. Reports 27; 44 Northeastern Re
porter 715; 34 Lawyers' Reports Annotated 322; 55 Am. State Reports 640;
In re Houdayer's Estate, i5o N. Y. Reports 37; 44 Northeastern Reporter
718; 34 Lawyers' Reports Annotated 235; 55 Am. State Reports 642; Buck v.
Beach, Indiana Reports; 7 Northeastern Reporter 962.
26. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. Reports x88.
THE MODERN "DR1OIT D 'A UBAINE."
person or corporation of a third State. they may be subject to
three taxes. The State where he lived lays a succession tax on
their full value because he was subject to its power. The State
in which the bonds are deposited for safe keeping lays a tax
of the same, or perhaps greater amount, on. their full value,
because the bonds are in its hands, and it will not let them go
without receiving it. The State where the debtor who signed
the bonds belongs can also levy as large a tax, because it can
refuse any remedy in its courts for their collection except on
such terms as it may itself lay down. So in the case of corpora-
tion stocks,- the shareholder's estate pays one succession tax to
the State of which he was a citizen, and those who succeed to
him pay another to the State chartering the corporation, and
possibly a third to a State in which the stock certificates were
kept; 27 for by holding on to them till such tax were paid, it
could put a serious obstacle in the way of their sale and
transfer.
It is to be remembered also that there is no constitutional
limit to the rate of taxation. In Wisconsin, collateral succes-
sions falling to the remoter kindred are subject to a deduction
in favor of the State of fifteen per cent. In Holland in the
eighteenth century thirty per cent was subtracted. 28 Three
such taxes would leave of the oyster little but the shell.
In 1898, during the war with Spain, Congress also levied an
inheritance tax, and the burden on the succession was heavier
still, until the repeal of that measure a few years afterwards.
It did not, however, apply to personal property here, passing
on the death of the owner to citizens of another country. 2 9
The results of this condition of multiple taxation are rapidly
becoming apparent.
Capitalists are beginning to center their investments at
home. They prefer to put their money in domestic stocks and
securities; for these, upon their death, will be taxable but once.
They are inquiring in which States, out of their own, it is
safest to make or maintain investments; that is, in which States
there are either no inheritance-tax laws or no inequitable ones.
They are organizing corporations which never die, to hold their
property. They are taking title jointly with their wives or
children, so that death leaves the survivor the sole owner.
It has been said that a country should never tax anything of
27. In re Bronson, z5o N. Y. Reports i; 44 Northeastern Reporter 707.
28. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations. III, Book V, 326.
29. Eidman v. Martinez 184 U, S. Reports 578.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
value which, if not taxed, would be likely to find its way there.
and which, if taxed, would be able to escape from its power.3 0
The American people are quick-witted. It will not take
long for all of them to learn in which of the States they can
and in which they cannot do business without subjecting their
property, in case of death, to what is practically double
taxation.
Wall Street is to-day the financial center of a great stretch
of American territory. The trust companies, the banks, and
the safety deposit vaults of New York City hold vast amounts
of moneys, bonds and commercial paper belonging to residents
of other States, who have left them there for security, or to use
them for investment and re-investment. Their owners are
taxable on them where they live. Their estates are taxable on
them there, if they die. Let those men once fully understand
that their estates would be also taxable on them in New York,
and it will not be long before their investments take a new
shape or are put under different keeping.
An inheritance tax by a State upon what is left by its own
inhabitants is right and just. It is right and just to place it
upon real estate situated within its territory, and belonging to an
estate of a dead man. It may be not unfair and not impolitic to
plade it-upon tangible personal property of such an estate, which
has been statedly kept within its territory, and on which no
stich tax is imposed in the State or country to which its former
owner belonged. But to tax it twice; to wring from widow or
children or creditors, who have already paid one inheritance
tax to the State under whose laws the estate is in course of settle-
ment, another of a like kind, if not unfair, is certainly impolitic.
It contravenes the settled conceptions of private international
law-conceptions that, through long ages of unbroken tradition,
have worked their way into the popular mind, and become
identified with those of social justice and economic law.
"Ein tiefer Sinn wohnt in den alten Erduchen.
Mkann muss sie ehren. "
According to these, the succession to a dead man's goods is
to be determined by the law either of the country of which he
was a citizen or of that-generally the same-in which he had
his home; and through that law it is to be worked out to the
last detail.
As death comes but once to every man and is the one event
3o. See David A. Wells on Taxation, Cyclop. of Political Science, adfin.
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on the happening of which the devolution of his, estate takes
place, so that devolution, to work justice, must, as far, at least,
as his personal property may be concerned, follow one single
course of law.
During the last few years the principal nations of continen-
tal Europe have held four successive conferences at the Hague,
to regulate the rights of the citizens of 'each with respect to
acts and transactions that may come under consideration in the
courts of the rest. On several points they have reached a
definite agreement, in the shape of reciprocal conventions, rati-
fied by the leading powers. A new convention was proposed
by the last conference, held in June, 1904, on the subject of
succession to the dead. It secures its regulation according to
the law of the country of which the former owner was a citizen
or subject.
England and the United States have thus far adhered to the
view that the law of the land in which he had his home should
govern. But under either rule, the same end is secured-unity
of administration. A single succession is to be regulated by a
single law.
Our new American practice must operate as a divisive force
within the American Union. It attacks the prosperity of the
country at a vital point. The United States have grown great
"aud rich because of the principle of absolute free trade between
the States so far as anything in the nature of a tariff is con-
cerued, and absolute free Lrade in all respects except so far as
Congress may see fit to legislate to the contrary. It was the
change to this policy from that of the pre-constitutional era
that made the United States a. living nationality. Under the
Arficles of Confederation, each of the thirteen equal sovereigns
could tax and often did tax the products of the others. In
May, 1784,31 for instance, Connecticut laid a duty on all goods
imported from any other State, except such as had been pre-
viously imported from abroad by a citizen of Connecticut for
use or sale in Connecticut. This law was expressly made
applicable even to the baggage of passengers arriving by water.
To such legislation the Constitution of the United States
opposed an effective bar, and in so doing benefited every State
to the injury of none.
A recent statement from the Bureau of Statistics at Wash-
ington shows that the total value of the goods dealt in last year
31. Statutes, Ed. 1784, 271.
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throughout the United States in their internal trade, based on
what they cost the first consumer, was twenty-two billion dol-
lars. This is nearly fifteen times as great as that of the goods
which we export; nearly twice that of all the goods imported
during the same year in international trade throughout the
worild; and more than twice that of the whole world's exports
for the same period. Much of this home trade is purely domes-
tic; but much, also, is trade between the States.
Anything which impedes the free transmission of money or
moneyed securities from one State to another so far unstrings
the sinews of this commerce between the States. To tax their
transmission when they pass in a mass, by the event of the
owner's death, is to create an impediment to their transmission
by him during his life which the public are fast learning to
regard as very serious.
This evil first arose during the closing years of the nine-
teenth century. How shall it be remedied in the twentieth?
Could Congress treat it as so far affecting commerce between
the States (and with foreign nations, for the double burden falls
often on foreign heirs or legatees) as to justify a statute of the
United States providing that such a tax, as regards any one
estate or any one item of property belonging to an estate, could
be laid but once?3 2 If so, it would be to advance the legisla-
tive powers of the nation a step farther than they have ever
yet gone, and weaken correspondingly the sovereignty of the
States. If, on the other hand, Congress has no such power,
does it not naturally lead to the conclusion that the States have?
Certainly a remedy more in accordance with our constitutional
traditions than an Act of Congress would be concerted action
to the same end by the States under the principle of reciprocity.
From the beginnings of American history, neighboring
English colonies were accustomed, at times, to send delegates
to mutual conferences on matters of common interest. When
they became States, the game practice was continued. Agree-
ments were made in such conventions while the Articles of Con-
federation were in force, affecting matters of importance,
although some of the statesmen of the day viewed them with
disfavor as contrary to the spirit of the confederated govern-
ment and tending to disintegrate the Union. 8 3
32. That it could, would seem to follow from the reasoning of the Court in
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 United States Reports 258, 266.
33. Madison's introduction to his Journal of the Federal Convention
(Scott's Ed.), 47.
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This led to the provision in the Constitution of the United
States (Art. I, See. io) that no State should "enter into any
Treaty Alliance or Confederation" nor . . . "without the
consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State or with a foreign'Power."
The courts have construed these provisions so as to make
them detract as little as may be from the sovereignty of the
States.
Three principles may be considered as settled with regard
to them:
i. Thej do not refer to any agreements not affecting the
political relations of a State to another State or to the United
States. It was their object to prevent the formation of any
combinations of States that might encroach upon the supremacy
of the United States. a
4
2. No agreement or compact between States is to be deemed
of that nature, unless it is clearly such. 3 s
3. Agreements or compacts between States of a political
nature, although made without asking or obtaining the consent
of Congress, are not invalid if Congress afterwards should
ratify them. 3 6
In practice, the States from the first have regarded this
section of the Constitution as not precluding arrangements and
agreements between any of them of a business character, which
they might deem of mutual advantage.
They have by concurrent grants of charters similar in form
created inter-State corporations, which are as much at home in
one State as another, and have, in each, the same powers and
rights under the same name and with the same members. 
3 7
Inter-State Commissions have been constituted by appoint-
ments made by neighboring States, to ascertain and mark the
boundary between them. 8 8
Statutes to promote freedom of intercourse and exchange of
business between States, have been passed by one State in
34. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. Report 503, 519; Williams v.
Brufy, 96 U. S. Reports 176.
35. Baltimore and Ohio .R. R, Co. v. Harris, 12 Wallace's Reports 65, 82.
36. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheaton's Reports i; Cf. 21 U. S. Statutes at
Large 351; Wharton v. Wise, 1s3 U. S. Reports 155.
37. Two Centuries' Growth of American Law 279; Graham V. Boston,
Hartford and Erie R. R. Co., 118 U. S. Reports 169, 170; Report of the
American Historical Association for 1902, 1, 268.
38. Papers of the New Haven Colony Historical Society, III, 284, 286.
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favor of non-residents, conditioned on the existence of like
legislation in the State of which they may be citizens.
Since the introduction of automobiles, statutes have been
passed in some States requiring them to be registered and
numbered, and the number, with the first letter of the name of
the State, to be displayed on the vehicle, but with a provision
that this shall not apply to automobiles coming into the State
from another in which they had been registered and numbered
under a similar law, and which make a similar display of the
letter and number required there. 3 9
Foreign insurance companies are often prohibited by statute
from entering a State to do business, unless they fulfill certain
prerequisites, with an exception in favor of those coming from
a State or country where no such conditions are exacted from
companies of the State enacting such statute.4 0 So they are
often subjected to certain taxes or fees, if and only so long as
such taxes or fees are required by the State of their charter
from companies created by the State by which the statute is
passed. 4 1
Reciprocity with reference to foreign countries is also a
feature of some of our State statutes for the removal of the
common law disability to hold real estate. It is removed as
respects citizens of countries imposing no such disability on
American citizens who may seek to acquire lands within their
jurisdiction. 42 In some of our treaties with foreign powers,
the United States agree to urge the adoption of such legislation
on the part of the States where it may not already exist. 4 1
Statutes have been passed by one State to promote the
administration of justice in certain others, or in all others on
condition of reciprocal legislation on their part.
Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century New Hamp-
shire enacted a statute to the effect that if one of her inhabitants
were wanted in any other State as a witness for the -prosecution
in a case of felony, a subpoena requiring him to repair thither
to testify at the trial might issue from a New Hampshire court
on the request of the judicial authorities of the other State.
Proper compensation for the expenses of the journey was to be
39. Public Acts of Connecticut, 1903, 73.
40. See General Statutes of Connecticut, §§ 3508, 3544, 3652.
41. Public Statutes of Rhode Island, Rev. of 1882, p. 396, sec. 23; New
York Revised Statutes, 9th Ed., II, 1146.
42. See Texas Civil Statutes, I, Art. 9 (a statute passed in 1854).
43. See our Convention of 1853 with France. 2 U. S. Rev. Stat. 25r.
THE MODERN "DROIT D'A UBAINE."
tendered, and if after such tender to the person whose presence
was desired, he failed to appear at the trial, he was to be liable
to a forfeiture of $300. Maine then adopted a similar statute
except that it applied only to prosecutions pending in a New
England State. Massachusetts followed in the same line, except
that she confined the remedy to neighboring States and to
Maine, and in 1902 New York did the same with respect to
bordering States, but on condition of the enactment on their
part of reciprocal legislation of similar effect. Connecticut and
Pennsylvania have since passed laws on this subject of the same
general purport.
44
In some similar way the States of the United States may yet
come to a mutual understanding and reciprocal justice become
the rule in dealing with successions, whether by will or by
inheritance.
A suggestion to that end was made in z9o, by the Buffalo
Conference on Taxation. This body, composed of representa-
tives of about thirty States, appointed by their respective Gov-
ernors, unanimously adopted this resolution:
"Whereas, modern industry has overstepped the bounds of
any one State, and commercial interests are no longer confined
to merely local interests; and
"Whereas, the problem of just taxation cannot be solved
yithout considering the mutual relations of contiguous States;
be it
Resolved, that this Conference recommend to the States the
recognition and enforcement of the principles of interstate
comity in taxation. These principles require that the same
property should not be taxed at the same time by two State
jurisdictions, and to this end that if the title deeds or other
paper evidences of the ownership of property, or of an interest
in property are taxed, they shall be taxed at the situs of the
property, and not elsewhere. These principles should also be
applied to any tax upon the transfer of property in expectation
of death, or by will, or under the laws regulating .the distribu-
tion of property in case of intestacy."1
48
The Massachusetts Tax Commission (of which Professor
Taussig of Harvard was a leading member), in x897 reported a
bill to carry out the same principle, though on somewhat
different lines.
48
44. Public Statutes of New Hampshire, Ed. 1842, p. 382; of Maine, Ed.
1871, p. 876; of Mass., Ed. i882, p. 986; Public Acts of Connecticut, 19o3, 57;
General Laws of N. Y., 1902, p. 328.
45. Judson on Taxation, p. 547, note.
46. Report of the Commission, p. I9r.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
Machinery to facilitate a concert of action for the accom-
plishment of some such result has for some years been in
existence and active operation. This is the annual Conference
of Commissioners of States on Uniform Legislation, held in
connection with the meetings of the American Bar Associaion,
and now representing a large majority of all the States. Its
office is to frame and recommend to the States for adoption bills
for suitable laws on subjects of common concern which ought
to be regulated everywhere in the same way. The result of its
labors may be seen in the existence of identical laws in the
statute books of a number of States, which have been adopted
on its initiative, the most conspicuous instance being that of the
Negotiable Instruments Act.
It may well be doubted whether the form of reciprocity
recommended by the Buffalo Conference is the best. It is not
that naturally suggested by the Anglo-American rules of private
international law. These would favor adhesion to the law .of
the State where the succession occurred-that of the last
domicil of the deceased owner. On the other hand, the plan so
proposed might be more answerable to the demands of modern
society. It would serve to pay for protection to property
actually received, in contradistinction from protection theo-
retically imputed.
But the only question which can be considered within the
limits of this paper is the larger one of the possibility and
expediency of any reciprocal arrangements looking in this
direction.
Could they or could they not be regarded as varying the
public relations of the States concerned? Would or would not
each stand towards the other in the attitude of a favored nation,
since its citizens would be freed from a burden remaining upon
those of other States? Is or is not a statutory grant of an
exemption from taxation in favor of those belonging to another
sovereignty, conditioned on the concession of a similar privi-
lege by the latter to the citizens of the State enacting the
first statute, and followed by such a concession, in substance a
political compact between the enacting powers?
If there be any such constitutional bar, it could be easily
removed.
The arrangement could hardly be deemed to stand on the
footing of a treaty, alliance or confederation. If not that, the
consent of Congress would avoid any possible objection. There
is no reason to doubt that this would be gladly given. Congress
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could hardly fail to welcome any proposition from States, look-
ing towards concurrent legislation of the description named.
Not only would it remove what is not unlikely to prove a
serious impediment to free commercial intercourse between the
States, but it would remove it in the interest of fair dealing
and equal rights.
It may be suggested that even with the authority of Congress
no such exclusive reciprocity could be established between two
States, by reason of the further constitutional provision (Art.
IV, Sec. 2) that the citizens of each State shall enjoy the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
The purpose of this section, however, is to prevent discrim-
ination by one State against the citizens of another. Can it be
said that a statute makes such a discrimination, if it leave them
entitled to the same privileges and immunities as those pos-
sessed by the citizens of the State making the enactment? The
citizens of that State being required to pay a succession tax,
can the citizens of another State, coming there to receive
an inheritance or bequest, complain if they are subjected
to the same burden, even if those of a third State may not
be? 4 7 Is not the discrimination which the Constitution pro-
hibits one in favor of residents against non-residents, rather
than one between non-residents, who are citizens of different
States?
The Supreme Court of the United States in x831 had before
them a cause which showed the complications as to State sov-
ereignty over dead men's estates, existing even under the estab-
lished principles of private international law. A. citizen of
Virginia died in Pennsylvania, leaving personal property in the
District of Columbia. A local administrator was appointed in
Washington, and the question was whether the local law there
or the law of Virginia should govern the distribution of the
Washington assets. The Court held that as the District of
Columbia had the fund in its power, its law must control its dis-
position.
"Whether," it added in its opinion, "it would or would not
be politic to establish a different rule by a convention of the
States, under constitutional sanction, is not a question for our
consideration. But such an arrangement could only be carried
into effect by a reciprocal relinquishment of the right of grant-
ing administration to the country of the domicil of the
47. Paul v. Virginia, 8 WaUace's Reports, 168, z8o; Blake v. McClung
,72 U. S. Reports 239, 248, 257.
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deceased exclusively, and the mutual concession of the right to
the administrator so constituted, to prosecute suits every-
where, in virtue of the power so locally granted him; both of
which concessions would most materially interfere with the
exercise of sovereign right, as at present generally asserted and
exercised."48
The convention here suggested, no doubt, was one to be
called by Congress, under Article V of the Constitution of the
United States, to propose amendments to it. There had then
been but one instance of the convocation of any other kind of
convention of representatives of States since 1789. That was
the Hartford convention of 3184, of delegates from three States,
and it had been generally and unsparingly denounced as an
unconstitutional assemblage for illegal purposes. 49
Since that time, however, another of a more imposing char-
acter, and equally political in its objects, has been held at
Washington-the Peace Convention of i86z-in which twenty-
one States participated, and which was officially recognized by
the President of the United States. The public were satisfied
that this body accomplished a useful work in bridging over the
passage of power from one party to another at a time when
every day of continued peace was of the highest national impor-
tance, and although its right to act or indeed to exist was vigor-
ously denied upon the floor by some of its own members, 6 0 the
verdict of history must be in its favor.
Since then, besides many conferences or conventions from
time to time of representatives of States under executive
appointment, the national Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Legislation, to which reference has been made, has
become a standing institution of unquestioned authority. That
authority, indeed, is only to deliberate and to recommend. It
makes no agreements between States. But it does initiate
action by the States. through which, on some points, they are
brought by the legislative action of each into a position of agree-
ment.
Should it be able to agree on the recommendation of a
definite, equal and consistent policy as to the subject which has
been under our consideration, expressed in the form of an iden-
tical statute for general adoption in each of the States which it
48. Smith, Adm'r, v. Union Rank of Georgetown, 5 Peters' Reports 58
526.
49. Adams, New England Federalism, 245, 256.
So., Debates and Proceedings of the Peace Convention of X861E, X29, 134,415.
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represents, it is not impossible that, one after another, the
States would fall into line and follow the plan proposed.',
The tendencies of the time make for such a movement.
Individualism and State-isolation are each giving way at every
point of material contact to Collectivism. The time-spirit and
the world-politics of the twentieth century alike point to
reciprocal governmental action on a great scale, for the preven-
tion of international or inter-State complications and collisions,
as the true basis of national prosperity.
Simeon E. Baldwin.
5t. One State has already made a move in this direction. Connecticut
before 19o3 laid succession duties on all estates of her citizens, within her jur-
isdiction. In X903 she also laid them on all personal property of non-resident
decedents, within her jurisdiction, but with a proviso waiving their enforce-
ment as to the latter in case of those residing in a State or country which does
not exact such duties upon personal property of Connecticut decedents.
within its jurisdiction. Public Acts of 1903, p. 43, see. 2; Gallup's Appeal.
76 Conn. Reports 627; 57 Atlantic Reporter 699.
